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REFLECTIONS ON THE FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMON CURRENCY 
Abstract 
This paper studies the likely consequences of monetary unification among 
the EC members for the conduct of fiscal policy in the EC countries (and by an 
emerging Federal European Fiscal Authority). Among the conclusions are the 
following. If the Eurofed is to be independent, the external exchange rate 
policy of the EC should be assigned to the Eurofed and not to the fiscal 
authorities. Effective (as opposed to formal) independence of the Eurofed is 
going to be very difficult to achieve. Coordinated upper ceilings on national 
public sector financial deficits are unnecessary and probably undesirable. 
Coordination of national public expenditure policies, tax policies and 
borrowing policies is in principle desirable for both efficiency and 
distributional reasons. The empirical models required for a serious welfare 
analysis of fiscal policy coordination do not yet exist. 
KEY WORDS: Monetary union, fiscal policy coordination, externality 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE FISCAL IIPLIC!TIONS OF! CODON CURRENCY 
Villem H. Buiter and Kenneth M. Kletzer 
1. Introduction: Sense and Nonsense in the Delors Report. 
The much increased likelihood of significant advances in European 
monetary integration-and even of European monetary union in the medium-term 
future-has not surprisingly shifted the spotlight on the need for 
coordination of fiscal policies as a complement to monetary unification. The 
Delors Report [1989] made much of the fiscal implications of the movement 
towards a greater degree of rigidity of nominal exchange rates among 
participants in the exchange rate arrangements of the European Monetary System 
(EMS). 
A monetary union would require a single monetary policy and 
responsibility for the formulation of this policy would consequently
have to be vested in one decision-making body. In the economic 
field a wide range of decisions would remain the preserve of 
national and regional authorities. However, given their potential
impact on the overall domestic and external economic situation of 
the Community and their implications for the conduct of a common 
monetary policy, such decisions would have to be placed within an 
agreed macro-economic framework and be subject to binding procedures 
and rules. This would permit the determination of an overall policy 
stance for the Community as a whole, avoid unsustainable differences 
between individual member countries in public sector borrowing
requirements and place binding constraints on the size and the 
financing of budget deficits. (Delors Report [1989, p.18]) 
No deficits, please. 
There are frequent further references in the Delors Report to the need to 
control national public sector deficits and in a number of places the Report 
becomes rather specific about the constraints to be imposed on national 
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budgetary policy. The passage quoted below (and similar ones scattered 
through the Report) make this clear: 
In the budgetary field, binding rules are required that would: 
firstly, impose effective upper limits on budget deficits of 
individual member countries of the Community, although in setting
these limits the situation of each member country might have to be 
taken into consideration; secondly, exclude access to direct central 
bank credit and other forms of monetary financing while, however, 
permitting open market operations in government securities; thirdly,
limit recourse to external borrowing in non-Community currencies. 
(Delors Report [1989, p. 24]) 
Space constraints do not permit an exhaustive analysis of this rather 
unusual statement. Note however, in the first proposed binding rule, the 
startling asymmetry of the constraints on the public sector deficit: upper 
limits but no lower limits. Such an asymmetry can only be rationalized 
through a belief that absent these constraints there would be a bias towards 
government deficits that are too large rather than too small. The reader of 
the Report is provided neither with a criterion for measuring excess or 
deficiency in public sector deficits nor with a hint of the evidence on which 
the empirical judgement is based. The statement appears to represents the 
typical Pavlovian conditioned reflex of fiscally conservative central bankers 
when faced with any and all government deficits. 
An independent European Central Bank: form and substance. 
The second proposed binding rule only makes sense if one believes that it 
is possible that the new "independent" European System of Central Banks (ECB) 
could still be forced (at any rate under extreme circumstances such at those 
represented by a very high public debt overhang) into inflationary 
monetization. Such a situation could come about either because the ECB would 
lack formal independence or because, despite formal independence, the ECB 
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would choose to lose a game of chicken with the budgetary authorities rather 
than causing a monetary and financial crisis by not giving in. In what 
follows the wisdom (or lack of it) of having an independent Central Bank will 
not be considered. There are good arguments both for and against it. The 
discussion is limited to the meaning of 'independence' and the means of 
achieving it. 
An effectively independent ECB is one which cannot be forced ,either by 
law or by circumstances under the control of the budgetary authorities, (be 
they member state governments or an emerging central fiscal authority) to 
monetize deficits, to engage in open market operations or to engage in foreign 
exchange market interventions (especially nonsterilized interventions). 
Even if it were possible to identify any given change in the stock of 
base money either as additional money issued "to finance the government 
deficit", or as money issued as the counterpart of an open market purchase or 
as money issued as the counterpart of a nonsterilized purchase of official 
foreign exchange reserves, the distinction would be behaviourally meaningless 
unless the different ways in which an additional ECU gets into the system 
somehow convey different signals about the future actions of the monetary 
authority. In any case, monetary deficit financing, money injected through 
open market purchases and money injected through nonsterilized purchases of 
foreign exchange cannot be separately identified from the data. The three 
sources of base money growth are also operationally equivalent. 
Consider e.g. the case of an accounting period during which the 
government deficit excluding borrowing from the Central Bank is, say, ECU 100, 
the monetary base and the Central Bank's holdings of public debt each increase 
by ECU 100 and the stock of foreign reserves remains unchanged. This could be 
interpreted as representing ECU 100 of monetary financing of the government 
4 
deficit with no net open market purchase of government debt by the Central 
Bank and no unsterilized or sterilized foreign exchange market intervention. 
Alternatively it could be interpreted as the outcome of zero monetary 
financing of the deficit, ECU 100 of open market purchases of government debt 
by the Central Bank and zero unsterilized and sterilized foreign exchange 
market intervention. A third possible interpretation is to view it as the 
outcome of the following set of financial operations. First, ECU -100 of 
monetary financing of the deficit. The Treasury is "overfunding" the deficit 
by borrowing ECU 200 from the non-Central Bank public (ECU 100 more than the 
government deficit) and thus increasing its balance with the Central Bank by 
ECU 100. This corresponds to an ECU 100 reduction both in the monetary base 
and in Central Bank holdings of government debt. Second, ECU 300 of open 
market purchases of public debt by the Central Bank (that is an ECU 300 
increase in the monetary base and an equal increase in Central Bank holdings 
of public debt). Third, ECU 100 of sterilized purchases of foreign exchange 
(that is an ECU 100 increase in foreign exchange reserves and an equal 
reduction in Central Bank holdings of public debt) and fourth, ECU 100 of 
nonsterilized sales of foreign exchange reserves (that is an ECU 100 reduction 
in reserves matched by an equal reduction in the monetary base). There is no 
natural benchmark or counterfactual. There are too many degrees of freedom. 
If a Central Bank is formally independent but can easily be manoeuvred by 
the fiscal authorities into a position where, given the Central Bank's own 
objectives, the optimal thing to do is to create money to a much greater 
extent than it would have chosen to do if the fiscal authorities could have 
been induced to act differently, then Central Bank independence is an empty 
shell. Substantive independence presupposes a non-trivial domain over which 
choice can be exerted. Even if every inhabitant of Bangladesh were formally 
5 
free to buy a Rolls Royce (which owing to import restrictions in that country 
is actually unlikely to be the case) the budget constraints of most 
Bangladeshis make this formal freedom an empty one. 
One can easily imagine a formally independent Central Bank with a strong 
(but not an absolute) aversion to inflation, confronting a fiscal authority 
that is persistently unwilling (even though technically able) to cover current 
outlays with current revenues. Assume that, if the Bank does not provide 
accommodating monetary growth and the Treasury does not reduce the deficit, 
the public debt-GDP ratio will increase steadily. If the debt were to grow 
persistently faster than the rate of interest, eventual insolvency of the 
Exchequer would result. Even if there is no threat of insolvency, the 
increasing debt burden would, if there is no "fist-order" debt neutrality, put 
upward pressure on real interest rates and crowd out interest-sensitive 
categories of private spending or increase the external current account 
deficit. 
Sargent [1986, pp. 19-39] contains an interesting description (attributed 
by Sargent to Neil Vallace) of this game of "chicken" between a Central Bank 
and a Treasury. "Chicken" is a non-cooperative game in which both players 
promise that they will adopt the strategy of Stackelberg leaders. For each of 
the players, of course, the announced strategy is feasible only if the other 
player acts as a follower. This struggle for dominance between the monetary 
and fiscal authorities represents a situation of Stackelberg warfare (Sargent 
[1986, p. 37]). To complicate matters, in the USA the game is between the 
Central Bank and a rather more Balkanized set of fiscal authorities, i.e. it 
is a three- or more sided game of chicken. 
The Central Bank asserts that, come hell or high water, it will not 
engage in inflationary monetization, in the hope of forcing the fiscal 
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authorities to take steps to reduce the deficit. A unified fiscal authority 
counters by asserting that it will under no circumstances reduce its deficit, 
hoping to convince the Central Bank to monetize the deficit in order to 
prevent a steep rise in real interest rates, financial distress etc. 
Alternatively, with a Balkanized fiscal authority, the Central Bank may 
(mixing metaphors) suffer the fall-out from an unresolved game of chicken 
between two or more fiscal warlords. The Vhite House fiscal warlord may 
threaten to veto any tax increase ("read my lips") in the hope of forcing one 
or more of the Capitol Hill fiscal warlords to accept spending cuts. Blocking 
coalitions of Capitol Hill warlords may veto cuts in certain spending 
categories ("not in my constituency") in the hope either of directing the 
spending axe elsewhere or of securing a tax increase. 
Unpleasant things tend to happen when an irresistible force meets an 
immovable object. Vhile no one likes to be caught bluffing, the resolve of 
the Central Bank may well weaken as its sees the debt burden rising. If it 
believes the fiscal authority is unlikely to mend its ways, it may rationally 
opt to be chicken rather than risking a head-on collision. The dilemma is 
resolved through monetization and inflation. 
In a recent paper Ben Friedman [1990] has argued that in the years to 
come the rising corporate debt burden in the USA may play the role attributed 
to public debt in the Sargent-Vallace scenario: tough anti-inflationary 
monetary policy is not credible given the financial exposure and fragility of 
the US corporate sector. In the British context Buiter and Miller [1983] have 
identified a similar game of chicken during the 1970's between the trades 
unions on the one hand and the monetary and fiscal authorities on the other 
hand (in Britain the Central Bank is formally and effectively subordinate to 
the Treasury). Unions submitted inflationary wage demands (and often 
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succeeded in imposing inflationary wage settlements) in the expectation that 
demand management would be accommodating. No government would be willing to 
live with the unemployment consequences of non-accommodating monetary and 
fiscal policy. Governments talked tough about not validating inflationary 
wage and price developments. During most of the seventies it was the 
governments that blinked and lost the game. The new Conservative 
administration that came to power in 1979 changed the rules of the game (at 
any rate during its early years) and broke the inflationary momentum with the 
deepest recession since the 1930's. 
One way to increase the likelihood that the Central Bank will win the 
game of chicken with the fiscal authorities is by convincing the latter that 
the Central Bank is implacably, irrevocably and unalterably opposed to any and 
all inflation. This could be achieved by the founding fathers and mothers of 
the Central Bank appointing someone (or a group of people) to head the Central 
Bank who is known to possess extreme, perhaps even irrational or pathological, 
inflation aversion. (The appointment procedure for the first and subsequent 
heads of the Central Bank will of course be crucial for this to work). It 
isn't wise for anyone to play a game of chicken with an adversary who may be 
slightly insane. Believing it is dealing with an anti-inflationary fanatic of 
doubtful rationality, the Treasury may prefer to give in rather than to test 
the resolve of the Central Bank. The possible rationality of choosing an 
agent who does not exactly share one's objectives (or who may even be 
irrational) is explained very clearly in Schelling [1960] 
The use of thugs and sadists for the collection of extortion or the 
guarding of prisoners, or the conspicuous delegation of authority to 
a military commander of known motivation, exemplifies a common means 
of making credible a response pattern that the original source of 
decision might have been thought to shrink from or to find 
profitless, once the threat had failed. (Just as it would be 
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rational for a rational player to destroy his own rationality in 
certain game situations, either to deter a threat that might be made 
against him and that would be premised on his rationality or to make 
credible a threat that he could not otherwise commit himself to, it 
may also be rational for a player to select irrational partners or 
agents.) (Schelling [1960], pp. 142-143) 
This idea has recently been taken up again, amongst others by Rogoff [1985b]. 
Vhile formal independence of the ECB is not sufficient to rule out the 
possibility of the ECB being forced into accommodating inflationary 
monetization, it is a necessary condition. It is important to stress that 
formal independence requires that the ECB have control over all sources of 
money creation: monetization of public sector deficits, monetization through 
open market purchases and monetization though (non-sterilized) purchases of 
foreign exchange. If, say, foreign exchange market intervention were to 
continue to occur at the initiative of the national Treasuries (or the central 
European Community (EC) fiscal authority) and if the ECB were not to be free 
to engage in sterilizing sales or purchases of public debt, there would not 
even be a formally independent monetary authority. Vb.at this means in 
practice is that for the Central Bank to be independent, the exchange rate of 
the ECU with non-EC currencies must be under the control of the Central Bank, 
and not of the national or supranational fiscal authorities. 
In principle it is of course possible for the Central Bank to have 
control over all sources of money creation and yet for the Treasury to have 
control over the exchange rate. This would be the case if fiscal instruments 
could be used to influence the various arguments in the money demand function. 
Even with perfect capital mobility between the EC and the rest of the world, 
international interest taxes or subsidies could enforce departures from 
uncovered interest parity. Since the EC is large in the world economy, fiscal 
policy could be used to influence the world level of real interest rates and 
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(given the stance of monetary policy) also the level of nominal interest 
rates, which is one of the arguments in the money demand function. If nominal 
interest rates affect EC money demand differently than money demand in the 
rest of the world, this would be a further channel through which the exchange 
rate could be influenced through fiscal policy. In addition, various spending 
and tax instruments could be used to influence the "scale variables" in the 
money demand function such as income or (financial) wealth. Given the rather 
severe limitations in practice on the flexible use of fiscal instruments and 
their uncertain effects on money demand and on the exchange rate, at least the 
day-to-day management of the exchange rate would have to be the province of 
monetary policy. 
The post-Delors Report consensus that is emerging in and around Brussels 
appears, fortunately, to have been purged of the Report's rather obsessive 
concern with upper limits on national public sector budget deficits. However, 
there also appears to be agreement that the determination of the common EC 
external exchange rate should not be the exclusive province of the "Eurofed", 
but should be determined by the appropriate political budgetary authority (or 
authorities) in the new Community. Ve sympathize with the view that the 
exchange rate is too serious a matter to be left to the Central Bank. The 
unavoidable implication of that view is, however, that the Central Bank cannot 
be independent. 
The authors of the Report may well be right in their lack of confidence 
(implicit in the (now apparently discarded) budgetary recommendations of the 
Report) in the independence of the proposed ECB. The recent embarrassing (to 
Central Bank pride) subjugation of the Bundesbank by Chancellor Kohl in 
connection with the latter's 'out of the blue' proposal for instant monetary 
union between the FRG and the GDR makes it clear that in the last resort even 
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the most independent Central Bank will give in to the political authorities. 
It is however, somewhat ironic to find side by side in the Delors Report a 
statement about the need to create an independent ECB and an implicit 
admission that there are identifiable contingencies when independence is bound 
to be an empty phrase. 
As regards the last of the triad of proposed binding rules, it is very 
hard to make sense of the curious concern with the currency composition of 
external borrowing. If a European national fiscal authority or an emerging 
Federal European fiscal authority can borrow externally in US Dollars, 
Japanese Yen or inconvertible Rubles, why shouldn't it? \lb.ere is the 
externality? 
2. Exchange rate unification, monetary unification and fiscal coordination. 
If phases 2 and 3 of the Delors Report's scheme for exchange rate 
unification and monetary union are eventually implemented, a single European 
Central Bank and a single European currency will emerge. The long-standing 
opposition to this scheme by British Prime Minister Thatcher (and the less 
vocal but probably no less determined opposition of the Bundesbank and part of 
the current West German political leadership) make it unlikely, however, that 
full exchange rate and monetary union for the European Community are imminent. 
The recent preoccupation of the West German authorities with the monetary, 
financial and fiscal consequences of their take-over of the bankrupt East 
German economy is likely to create further delays in the implementation of the 
Delors monetary agenda. 
How robust is the proposition that exchange rate unification and monetary 
union create greater need for fiscal policy coordination than would prevail 
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under greater exchange rate flexibility? 
With a high degree of international capital mobility and a fixed nominal 
exchange rate (and a fortiori with a full single-currency, monetary union with 
pooled international reserves), individual national fiscal authorities will 
lose control over national seigniorage as a means of financing national public 
sector deficits. The total amount of seigniorage that can be extracted by the 
fixed exchange rate zone or the monetary union as a whole and its distribution 
among the members of the union (and between the member governments and a 
strengthened and enlarged central authority in Brussels) remain objects of 
choice and potential bones of contention. 
In the case of the European Community, the currencies of two of the 
intended members of the monetary union (The D-Mark and the Pound Sterling) 
have been used and continue to be used both as official international reserves 
and as components of private working balances by agents outside the proposed 
monetary union. The ECU, when it emerges as a full-fledged currency can be 
expected to play a similar international reserve and vehicle currency role. 
Ve can therefore anticipate bargaining over the distribution of both the 
external and the internal seigniorage. 
Changes in the degree of national control over seigniorage revenue will 
have implications for the rest of the budget, if only because government 
solvency constraints must be met. The concept of solvency used by 
macroeconomists and public finance specialists only makes sense in a 
dynamically efficient economy. In a non-stochastic world, dynamic efficiency 
rules out the possibility that the rate of interest be forever below the 
growth rate of real economic activity. In a dynamically efficient economy, a 
solvent government is assumed not to be able to play Ponzi games with its 
debt: the value of the outstanding national debt can be no_greater than the 
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sum of the present discounted value of anticipated primary (non-interest) 
public sector financial surpluses and the present discounted value of 
1anticipated future issues of high powered money . 
There are large differences in primary surpluses (as a proportion of GDP) 
between the members of the European Community. For the ten countries listed 
in Table 1 the general government primary surplus as a percentage of GDP/GNP 
in 1988 ranges from +4.6 percent for Denmark to -6.3 percent for Greece. For 
the nine countries for which net public debt-GDP ratios are given in Table 1, 
the range in 1988 is from 21.2 percent for Denmark to 123.7 percent for 
Belgium. There is no systematic tendency over the past decade for primary 
surplus-GDP ratios to be positively correlated with debt-GDP ratios. The 
arithmetic consequence is a very wide range of public sector financial 
balance-GDP ratios, from +0.8 percent for the U.K. to -14.5 percent for Greece 
in 1988. 
Recourse to seigniorage has been relatively small in most European 
Community member states (see Table 2). Exceptions to this rule are Italy 
(before 1986) and Portugal, Greece and Spain. 
Monetary policy can be an important policy instrument even if the use of 
base money as a source of seigniorage is negligible. If the right kind of 
nominal stickiness or inertia in wages or prices is present in an economic 
system with imperfect international capital mobility, real economic activity 
can be influenced both by the systematic and the unanticipated components of 
the monetary rule. Vith a fixed exchange rate and perfect international 
capital mobility national monetary stabilization policy has national effects 
only to the extent that it influences the world rate of interest. With a 
monetary union national monetary policy exists only through national influence 
on the decisions of the union's Central Bank. 
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3. National Solvency .Vithout National Monetary Policy. 
The public sector budget identity for any country 1 can be written as 
follows: 
. 
di= (ri - ni)di - ~i - ui 
Here dis the debt-GDP ratio, r the instantaneous real interest rate on 
the non-monetary public debt, n the growth rate of real GDP, ~ the primary 
surplus-GDP ratio and u seigniorage as a proportion of GDP (the ratio of 
changes in the stock of base money to nominal GDP). 
Vith the abolition of all remaining capital controls within the European 
Community, full covered interest parity can be expected to prevail among the 
member states. Vith complete and credible exchange rate unification, 
uncovered nominal interest rate parity will also be established among the 
members. Vhether or not this leads to greater convergence of real interest 
rates is a question that is theoretically and empirically open. Vith complete 
;nci+'!ln+~Tnon,,ci n,,-r~'haci;nrr Tl./"\TTO'r na-r;+·u {Dl>D\ nnn1;-nal ;-n+e...eie:,+ ~nnnl .:"n+.:n.­
..L.LLJ..JUUJ.&.LUu,.i. VVU.~ .PU..LV.LL O.L.J.LE, ,l'Vft'\.,.1. ,l' .L..LIJJ \.L.1..LJ .U.Vlll.L.LL ..I. ..1..1.LI., .L Oll \:;'{UCl,.J....LL.l<ltl.,.J.Ull 
implies real interest equalization. The behaviour of national producer and 
consumer price indices is far from being well characterized by PPP. Mean 
reverting tendencies appear to be weak or even absent for a number of key real 
exchange rate indices, so even as a long-run characterization of the data, PPP 
leaves a lot to be desired. 
It is true that real exchange rate volatility and uncertainty have been 
statistically associated very strongly with nominal exchange rate volatility 
and uncertainty. If this statistical association survives the Lucas critique 
when a further move towards reduced nominal exchange rate flexibility occurs, 
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there will be a reduction in those components of national real interest 
differentials that reflect nominal exchange risk premia. No such presumption 
exists for the contribution to national real interest differentials due to 
anticipations of real exchange rate appreciation or depreciation. For the 
sake of argument, however, consider the case in which following nominal 
exchange rate unification, national real interest differentials on the public 
debt vanish, except of course for differentials due to market perceptions of 
differences in national public debt default risk premia. 
Vith similar primary surpluses ~i , similar seigniorage ui and similar 
real interest rates ri, countries with high current debt-GDP ratios di will 
have more rapidly rising debt-GDP ratios unless higher GDP growth rates ni 
come to the rescue of the high debt countries. There is little evidence to 
support the view that high debt countries are high growth countries 
(see Table 1). 
The pure version of the solvency constraint does not rule out the 
possibility that a forever rising (and eventually unbounded) public debt-GDP 
ratio is consistent with solvency. As long as the growth rate of the debt-GDP 
ratio is less than ri- ni (which in a dynamically efficient economy will 
eventually or in the long run be some nonnegative number), d can rise without 
bound with the government's solvency intact. 
This surprising fiscal feat is possible because the government is assumed 
to have access to lump sum taxes which, without distortions or enforcement 
costs, enable it to appropriate (and to use for debt service) any amount of 
resources less than or equal to the sum of GDP and the interest on its debt. 
Allowing for distortionary taxation and/or for tax compliance costs is 
sufficient to establish a finite upper bound for the public debt-GDP ratio. 
Vhile these bounds need not be the same for all countries, it is likely that 
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the current high debt countries will encounter their barriers before the less 
indebted countries. Countries like the U.K. may already be in the position 
that a continuation of current primary deficits and seigniorage patterns 
implies a steadily declining debt-GDP ratio. 
With a currency union (or even just a credible fixed exchange rate 
system) a country headed for insolvency no longer has the option of 
unilaterally determining the extent to which it uses the inflation tax. 
Neither seigniorage narrowly defined (high-powered money creation), nor the 
rest of the "anticipated inflation tax" (the effects of anticipated inflation 
on the primary deficit through fiscal drag or through the Tanzi effect and the 
Tobin effect of expected inflation on the real interest rate), nor the 
"unanticipated inflation tax" on holders of long-dated nominally denominated 
government debt are national policy instruments any longer. It also seems 
unlikely that any single member country will have enough influence on the 
Community's Central Bank to allow it to assign the community-wide inflation 
rate to the solution of its national fiscal problems. That leaves cuts in its 
primary public sector deficit and/or default on its debt as the only two 
policy options. The perception by the market of the existence of default risk 
will, by adding a default risk premium to the interest rate on the public · 
debt, exacerbate the fiscal problem and bring forward the moment when actual 
default becomes inevitable. 
All this is likely to be painful for the inhabitants (and the government) 
of the heavily indebted country. The question is, should it be of concern to 
the other members of the Community? Are there efficiency or equity arguments 
for constraining the member states' public sector financial deficits, primary 
deficits or even spending and revenue-raising separately, that is is there a 
case for coordinating budgetary policy among the member states? 
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4. National Public Sector Deficits and Community-wide Interest Rates: 
Pecuniary vs. Technological Externalities. 
The arguments frequently made in favor of international coordination of 
fiscal policies, both in the scholarly literature and in nontechnical policy 
debate, appear to apply with equal force regardless of the exchange rate 
regime. They often rely on fiscal externalities or spillovers that are 
present whenever domestic and foreign government debts are traded 
internationally or indeed when any form of international transmission is 
present. A representative example of this kind of argument in a contribution 
to the policy debate can be found in the following quote from Professor 
Casella's response to an editorial opinion in The Economist which had stated 
that there was "no economic reason why the members of a common monetary system 
should not run budget deficits as they see fit." Referring to a common 
monetary system she writes: 
Suppose first, in accordance with standard economic theory, that 
national governments with tax-raising powers could be considered 
safe borrowers (in contrast to private corporations). National 
debts in a common currency would be perfect substitutes and would 
therefore earn a common interest rate. A spending spree by one 
member state (Italy?) could be accommodated with a small increase in 
the interest rate-given the absence of exchange rate risk-but it 
would be an increase in the interest rate on the debt of all member 
states. In other words, the value of government bonds everywhere
would fall, and the capital losses in the foreign portfolios would 
indirectly help to support the Italian deficit. Of course, the 
possibility of exporting the cost of financing government 
expenditure would distort incentives in the conduct of economic 
policy, in general leading to excessive deficits in all countries. 
Some form of coordination would be required. (Casella [1989] p. 4) 
Even when (small) spreads between national borrowing rates (reflecting 
differential risks of de jure or de facto repudiation) are possible, the story 
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just told could still hold. Quoting again, 
In a world with few borrowers, it may still be possible for one 
state to influence the value of the other states' debt if rates move 
in the same direction. (Casella [1989] p. 4) 
Frenkel, Goldstein and Masson [1988] in their survey of international coordination o 
economic policies state ( emphasis added) 
... that economic policy actions, particularly those of larger
countries, create quantitatively significant spillover effects or 
externalities for other countries, and that a global optimum
requires that such externalities be taken into account in the 
decision-making calculus. Coordination is then best seen as a 
facilitating mechanism for internalizing these externalities. 
(p. 3) 
They go on to stress the noncompetitive behavior of larger countries who 
"exercise a certain degree of influence over prices including the real 
exchange rate" (p. 3). 
No doubt the authors of these quotes are, like other professional 
economists, fully aware of the distinction between efficiency-based and 
distribution-based arguments for policy intervention (including international 
policy coordination) and know the conditions under which international 
spillovers can have important efficiency or distributional consequences. In 
policy-oriented economic writing aimed at a wider audience it is especially 
important to be clear and explicit (albeit non-technical) about the economic 
reasoning underlying key assertions and propositions. The subject of 
spillovers, international transmission and interdependence involves subtleties 
that make it mandatory to cover all bases when addressing the intelligent lay 
person. 
Since the late 19th century economists have recognized what are now 
called "technological externalities" as possible reasons for market failure 
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and as possible grounds for government intervention in the market mechanism. 
As Laffont [1987] states succinctly, a 
... technological externality [is], the indirect effect of a 
consumption activity or a production activity on the consumption set 
of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production
function of a producer. By indirect, we mean that the effect 
concerns an agent other than the one exerting this economic activity
and that this effect does not work through the price system.
(p. 263) 
Such technological externalities (positive or negative) will upset the 
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics and create a prima facie case 
for intervention. 
During the 1920s and 1930s another kind of externalities or external 
economies labeled "pecuniary external economies" by Viner [1931] was the 
subject of much confused debate. The classic article "Two Concepts of 
External Economies" by Scitovsky [1954] settled many of the central issues 
(see also Bohm [1987]). 
Pecuniary externalities work through the price system and refer to the 
effects of producer or consumer activities on the input or output prices of 
other producers, consumers or suppliers of factor services. It should be 
clear that when all the assumptions required for competitive equilibria to be 
Pareto optimal are satisfied, pecuniary externalities have no efficiency 
implications. They are merely another word for general market 
interdependence. When a consumer, alone or together with many other 
consumers, shifts his consumption bundle towards bananas and the price of 
bananas increases as a result, all those who were "long" in bananas (i.e. the 
net banana exporters) will benefit, and all those who were "short" in bananas 
(the net banana importers) will suffer a welfare loss. There may be important 
distributional issues involved, but there is no efficiency or market failure 
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argument for intervention. 
At its simplest, the example developed by Professor Casella can be 
interpreted as describing an "international pecuniary externality". Unless 
there are other departures from competitive efficiency, the higher foreign 
interest rate that results from increased domestic borrowing need not involve 
any inefficiency. There are interesting distributional issues (international 
and intergenerational) which we have analyzed in a number of papers (Buiter 
and Kletzer [1990a,b]). 
Much {though by no means all) of the work on international policy 
coordination uses national objective functions or social welfare functions 
that are not easily rationalized as utilitarian aggregators of underlying 
individual preferences. That need not pose any problems if one is interested 
in a positive theory of policy design. The objectives pursued by those 
actually in command of the instruments of economic policy may reflect narrow 
sectional or group interests rather than the utilitarian ideals of the 
philosopher kings that motivate many of the normative approaches to policy 
design. Even for many of the positive or descriptive approaches to economic 
policy design it remains true, however, that it is not easy to rationalize the 
policy makers' objectives in terms of the self-interest of any group, however 
broad or narrow. 
Vhen a utilitarian national objective function is optimized, it is 
important for a full appreciation of the meaning of statements such as 
,"cooperation increases (or reduces) national social welfare", to go behind 
the national (or global) social welfare functions and to verify what happens 
to the welfare of the individual consumers or households. 
In Buiter and Kletzer [1990b] we show that, in a two-country overlapping 
generations2 world with perfect international capital mobility, policy 
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cooperation is not required to achieve equilibria that are Pareto efficient in 
terms of the underlying private preferences. Vith only non-distortionary 
lump-sum taxes and transfers (and with government borrowing only constrained 
by the requirement that solvency be maintained), cooperation is required to 
achieve Pareto optima with respect to the two national social welfare 
functions. Cooperation and international transfers (or side payments) are 
required to achieve optimality with respect to a global social welfare 
function that can be seen as a utilitarian aggregator of the two national 
social welfare functions. In this case, the gains in national or global 
social welfare are purely distributional: some lose and some gain. A national 
social welfare function represents a specific weighting of the welfare of 
(successive generations of) a nation's residents. The global social welfare 
function represents a further specific weighting of the welfare of the 
residents of the two nations. Cooperation does not achieve a Pareto 
improvement with respect to the underlying individual preferences. 
Vhen distortionary taxes or subsidies are added to the instrument 
arsenal, it can easily happen that the achievement of a Pareto optimum with 
respect to the two national social welfare functions (or the achievement of an 
optimum for the global social welfare function) requires the use of the 
distortionary instruments. This will certainly be the case if there is no 
mechanism for effecting lump-sum international redistribution. For example, 
investment taxes and subsidies can be used to influence the distribution of 
income between the two countries' fixed factors (labor in Buiter and Kletzer 
[1990b]). In that example national social welfare Pareto optima and global 
social welfare optima will not be Pareto optima with respect to the underlying 
individual preferences. The cooperative pursuit of national social welfare 
here means that some efficiency is sacrificed in order to achieve preferred 
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distributional outcomes. 
There obviously is nothing wrong with knowingly trading off efficiency 
for equity. It is, however, not always obvious that this is what is being 
done when national social welfare functions are plonked down and optimized. 
It is also not hard to think of other examples in which cooperation can lead 
to efficiency gains as well as improved distribution or, in the spirit of 
Rogoff [1985a] and Kehoe [1986], to efficiency losses and worse distribution. 
the moral of all this is that it is wise to stand back and reflect a bit when 
confronted with a finding that cooperation does (or does not) improve social 
welfare. Careless use of a national social welfare function for optimal 
policy design in an otherwise sensible model of the economy may create the 
misleading impression that one is dealing with a representative agent model, 
the nadir of macroeconomic analysis. Redistribution and conflict are swept 
under the carpet and what may well be the major obstacles to cooperative 
international policy design are ignored. 
Returning to the problem of international interest rate spillovers, it is 
indeed likely that in a financially integrated Europe, borrowing by any 
government (or private agent) will put upward pressure on interest rates 
everywhere. If a government borrows to the point that its ability to service 
the debt becomes questionable, a default risk premium will be added to its 
borrowing costs and it may face credit rationing. Neither a community-wide 
increase in interest rates nor the market's response to a perception of 
sovereign risk need create an efficiency based argument for intervention or 
for coordination aimed at preventing these contingencies. 
Higher interest rates will have international distributional consequences 
that are a legitimate concern of policy makers. Higher interest rates 
redistribute income from borrowers to lenders. This is true within national 
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economies and between national economies. Vithin a national economy higher 
interest rates redistribute income towards rentiers and away from labour and 
the owners of other real resources. It also tends to be associated with 
intergenerational redistribution from the young to the old. In the 
international context, the major resource transfer from debtor countries to 
creditor countries following the sharp increase in real interest rates in the 
early eighties is a dramatic example of the redistributive implications of 
interest rate changes. 
Sovereign default risk affecting one of the member states may create 
externalities for the other member states that may be pecuniary or 
technological in nature. Asymmetric information and/or limited rationality 
may give rise to bandwagon or contagion effects that may cause default risk 
premia and credit rationing to spread to member countries for whom the 
fundamentals do not warrant such penalties. Such occurrences are, however, by 
no means certain. In the private sector we observe the coexistence of firms 
with very different credit ratings and conditions of access to credit markets. 
Default and bankruptcy of one firm, or even of a number of firms, need not 
results in panics and market seizures. 
Some of the concerns expressed about the high debt countries in the 
Community seem to be born from the fear that the Community as a whole will be 
compelled (or feel compelled) to socialize part or all of their debt. Vhile 
one cannot rule out categorically this or any other unusual future policy 
action by the new Community, there seems to be no compelling economic or 
political logic to support it. Even within existing nation states, provincial 
and local governments don't act as if they assume that the higher government 
tiers will routinely assume their liabilities. Vhen city governments go into 
(the public sector equivalent of) receivership, as New York City did in the 
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Seventies, the costs in terms of financial and economic disarray, loss of 
autonomy etc. appear to be sufficiently high to discourage emulation and 
repeat performances. 
Ve can therefore safely assume that even with a common European currency 
and unrestricted capital mobility, the Italian public debt will remain the 
Italian public debt, to be serviced out of Italian primary surpluses and out 
of whatever amount of seigniorage Italy manages to get from the ECB. 
International intra-Community transfers may well grow in significance as the 
Community matures. Among the criteria governing such transfers the relative 
magnitudes of the various national debts can be expected to play at most a 
very minor role. The total (private and public) international indebtedness of 
a country will, as one of the components of the wealth of the nation, play a 
role in future games of distribution, but the national debt per se can be 
expected to remain a national responsibility. 
Summarizing, international interdependence and international spillovers 
do not by themselves imply market failure and do not create an automatic 
efficiency case for any form of intervention including international policy 
coordination. Interdependence or spillovers reflecting the transmission of 
policy through competitive markets and prices (be they commodity prices or 
asset prices and rates of return) do not create an efficiency-based case for 
policy coordination unless there are other distortions or sources of market 
failure in the economy. This is true even if the policy authorities are 
"large" and deliberately try to influence market prices in the pursuit of 
national advantage. 
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5. Non-Valrasian Equilibria, Pecuniary and Technological Externalities. 
l&en the economy has "preexisting" distortions or when the instruments 
the government manipulates in the pursuit of national advantage create 
inefficiencies or distortions, an efficiency-based case for coordination may 
exist. Among the preexisting distortions that may make policy transmission 
through market prices inefficient are: distortionary taxes; technological 
consumption or production externalities; noncompetitive behavior; incomplete 
markets; and Keynesian market failure reflecting insufficient or excessive 
effective demand. 
Even when markets are competitive, policy-induced distortions are absent 
and conventional technological consumption and production externalities are 
absent, a role for policy coordination may exist. As pointed out by Laffont 
[1987], when we move away from competitive equilibria in which all the 
assumptions for Pareto optimality are satisfied, market prices may do more 
than equate supply and demand and distribute income: 
In economies with incomplete contingent markets, prices span the 
subspace in which consumption plans can be chosen. In economies 
with asymmetric information, prices transmit information. l&en 
agents affect prices, they affect the welfare of the other agents by
altering their feasible consumption sets or their information 
structures. (p. 264) 
In such economies the distinction between pecuniary and technological 
externalities vanishes because changes in prices do more than create or 
3destroy rents. It is quite possible that the arguments in favor of the 
'coordinated international management of international pecuniary fiscal 
externalities are (implicitly) based on such a non-Valrasian world view. It 
is of course always desirable to bring out explicitly either the reason(s) for 
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the breakdown of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics or the 
distributional criteria that support the cooperative fiscal policy 
prescription. 
Vith monetary policy emasculated as an instrument of national economic 
policy, the large differences between the debt burdens of Community member 
states foreshadow significant differences in the paths of future primary 
surpluses. Vhile current and future primary surpluses are a very imperfect 
measure of the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand, there is a 
presumption that countries saddled with the need for relatively large future 
primary surpluses will have a relatively contractionary stance of fiscal 
policy. 
If demand-deficient Keynesian equilibria are likely to result from 
contractionary fiscal policy actions, a prima facie case for policy 
intervention, including international coordination of policies, exists. In a 
Keynesian unemployment equilibrium the value of output foregone exceeds the 
value of the extra leisure "enjoyed" by the unemployed. This holds even in a 
closed economy. In addition, in an open economy, part of any demand 
contraction (fiscal or private) will spill over to the rest of the world 
through the deflating country's demand for imports and supply of exports. 
This will create a non-pecuniary externality to the extent that goods and 
labor are not priced properly. If nominal wage stickiness (or the combination 
of nominal wage stickiness and price stickiness) is the key link in the 
transmission mechanism that causes demand-deficient equilibria to result from 
a contraction of demand, the magnitude of the international spillover will 
actually be smaller (given perfect international capital mobility) with any 
credible fixed exchange rate regime than with a floating exchange rate regime. 
The payoff from international coordination is correspondingly reduced. 
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It goes without saying that the efficient use of policy instruments such 
as exhaustive national public spending with international technological 
externalities will in general require international policy coordination (see 
e.g. Kehoe [1986,1987]). Public expenditure for the abatement of pollution of 
rivers, oceans and the air is one example. Defense expenditures and 
expenditures on law enforcement (given the increasingly transnational nature 
of major criminal activities) are another. The same holds for the efficient 
use of distortionary taxes and transfers, even when the activities that are 
taxed or subsidized do not have direct international technological 
externalities. 'When there are such international externalities (think of the 
taxation or regulation of national activities producing acid rain, ozone holes 
or greenhouse effects) the case for international coordination of taxation, 
subsidization and regulation is of course reinforced. 
6. Conclusion. 
This paper studies only a few among the very large number of important 
fiscal policy issues facing the members of the European Community as they move 
along the road towards further economic and political integration. The new 
Europe will be characterized by greater (and increasing) mobility of factors 
of production, of owners of factors of production ,of beneficiaries of 
transfer payments and of consumers of local, regional, national and 
Community-wide public goods. Interesting issues arise when the domain of 
mobility of rational private agents and the span of fiscal control or the size 
of the regulatory jurisdictions do not coincide. Issues like tax 
harmonization and tax competition (see e.g. Giovannini [1988], Giovannini and 
Hines [1990], Razin and Sadka [1989], Sinn [1990a], become central issues in 
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addition to (or even rather than) concerns about the stabilization function of 
national fiscal policy. The application of destination vs. origin principles 
of commodity taxation and residence vs. source principles of (capital) income 
taxation will have major effects on competitiveness and the location of 
economic activity (Dixit [1985], Slemrod [1988], Krugman and Feldstein [1989], 
Sinn [1990b]). Internal transfer pricing by multinational corporations poses 
formidable challenges to the ability of national governments to tax 
multinationals' profits. The theory and practice of fiscal federalism will be 
required reading for European public finance scholars. Suitably modified 
versions of the theory of local public goods and of the theory of clubs will 
have to guide the design of efficient and fair tax and public expenditure 
systems and in the new Europe. 
For distributional reasons and, given the myriad departures from the 
competitive Valrasian and Tieboutian ideal types, for efficiency reasons also, 
coordination of national fiscal policies will be desirable in the new Europe 
(as it was in the old). There is no good argument why such coordination 
should give high priority (or indeed any priority) to binding agreements on 
public sector budget deficits. It is wellknown that the public sector deficit 
(level, change or share of GDP, "raw", structural, operational, full 
employment, demand-weighted, inflation-corrected, permanentized or otherwise 
transformed or transmogrified), is not an adequate measure of the impact of 
fiscal policy on aggregate demand or on aggregate supply (short-run or 
long-run), nor an index of financial crowding out pressure. In Buiter and 
Kletzer [1990a] we also show that any real effects of public sector deficits 
can be reproduced with a balanced budget and flexible taxes and transfers. It 
is very hard to come up with any reasonable argument for giving this statistic 
the attention it gets (See also Blinder and Solow [1974], Buiter [1983, 1985] 
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and Kotlikoff [1988]). 
There is no royal road to fiscal policy coordination. Agreements on 
contingent rules for the various tax, spending and financing instruments will 
have to be struck in the face not only of uncertainty about the exogenous 
environment, but also of "model uncertainty", i.e. uncertainty about the 
effects of policy instruments and exogenous events on key endogenous economic 
variables. Policy cooperation can at least ensure that strategic uncertainty 
doesn't complicate the task of economic management even more. 
The desire for maximal scope to respond flexibly to new contingencies 
will have to be balanced against the need for simplicity and transparency in 
the cooperative policy rules. The success of any common strategy depends on 
its credibility with the private sector inside and outside the Community. 
Unless the private sector knows and understands the policy rules and is 
capable of monitoring and verifying the adherence of the various governments 





1For this solvency constraint to be a non-trivial constraint, the public 
debt should be valued gross of any discount reflecting a perceived risk of 
default, and the interest rates used to discount future primary surpluses and 
seigniorage should be net of any default risk premium. 'When the market value 
of the debt is variable (and potentially different from its issue value, par 
value or redemption value) even without the presence of any default risk (as 
is for instance likely to be the case with long-dated debt), the calculation 
of what the value of the public would be in the absence of default risk is a 
non-trivial matter. 
2Examples of the use of the two-period OLG model in two-country models 
are Buiter [1981], Buiter and Eaton [1983], Kehoe [1986a], Hamada [1986] and 
Sibert [1988]. The Yaari-Blanchard OLG model has been applied to two-country 
models in Frenkel and Razin [1987], Obstfeld [1989] and Buiter [1989]. 
3van Huyck [1989] eliminates the central auctioneer and price-taking 
behavior from the Valrasian model. In the resulting model of "decentralized 
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